

Message Text

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ACTION SS-15

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OES-03 L-03 ACDA-05 SAM-01 AF-06 AID-05 DODE-00 PM-04

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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2631

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 JAKARTA 1823

FROM AMBASSADOR NEWSOM

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, APER

SUBJECT: ORGANIZING FOR MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

REF: STATE 303856

BEGIN SUMMARY: INDONESIAN HAS ITS OWN PRIORITIES AND MUST FACE CONFLICTING PRESSURES IN DEALING WITH ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. TO MAXIMIZE CHANCES OF IMPROVING INDONESIA'S PERFORMANCE ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US, WE MUST UNDERSTAND INDONESIA'S PERCEPTION OF ISSUES, SELECT CAREFULLY THOSE MATTERS WHICH WARRANT OUR ALL-OUT EFFORTS WITH GOI, AND IMPROVE TIMING AND MANNER OF OUR APPROACHES. END SUMMARY.

1. SINCE MY RETURN I HAVE GIVEN THOUGHT TO NEW ORGANIZATION FOR MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY OUTLINED REFTTEL, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION AS TO HOW WE MIGHT IMPROVE INDONESIA'S PERFORMANCE ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US.

2. IN UN AND OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA INDONESIA GIVES
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HIGH PRIORITY TO MAINTENANCE OF GOOD STANDING AS A NON-

ALIGNED NATION, AND WILL ONLY DEVIATE FROM CONSENSUS
NON-ALIGNED POSITION IF GOI PERCEIVES CLEAR NATIONAL
INTEREST; E.G. INDONESIAN VIEW OF ITS SECURITY INTEREST
PRODUCED UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR GKR. PRIORITY GIVEN TO
INDONESIA'S NON-ALIGNED POSITION NOW DOUBLY REINFORCED BY
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ON TIMOR. OTHER PRIORITIES
WHICH INDONESIA PERCEIVES IN FORA OF MULTILATERAL
DIPLOMACY RELATE TO ITS SOLIDARITY WITH ARAB WORLD, A
POSITION BASED LARGELY ON AWARENESS OF SENSITIVITIES
IN INDONESIAN MOSLEM POPULATION. (INDONESIA HAS, HOWEVER,
RESISTED ESTABLISHMENT PLO OFFICE IN JAKARTA.) INDONESIA
GIVES HIGH PRIORITY TO ASEAN AND WOULD OPPOSE ANY MOVE
RUNNING COUNTER TO AGREED POSITION TAKEN BY ORGANIZATION.
IT ATTACHES MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO ACCEPTANCE
PRINCIPLE OF ARCHIPELAGO IN LOS MATTERS IN ALL FORA.

3. INDONESIA IS TAKING MORE AND MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN
MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT
IS ITS MEMBERSHIP IN GROUP OF 19 AT CIEC. IN THIS AND
IN SPECIALIZED UN AGENCIES, WHILE INDONESIA WILL GENERALLY
SUPPORT THIRD WORLD POSITION THAT NEW ECONOMIC ORDER IS
NEEDED, ITS OFFICIALS WILL BE UNSYMPATHETIC TO
IRRESPONSIBLE INTERVENTIONS AND TO UNDUE POLITICIZATION
OF ECONOMIC ISSUES. MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE WALKED OUT
OF FAO MEETING LAST YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, BECAUSE HE FELT
PROCEEDING UNDULY POLITICIZED AND USELESS. UNFORTUNATELY,
HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT YET MATCHED BY ANY WILLINGNESS TAKE
STAND AGAINST SUCH IRRESPONSIBILITY. INDONESIA ALSO
SUPPORTS SOLIDARITY OF OPEC ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT SUPPORT
ARAB OIL EMBARGO.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, ON WHAT ISSUES MUST WE
EXPECT GOI OPPOSITION; ON WHAT ISSUES MIGHT WE MOVE GOI
AWAY FROM TOTAL OPPOSITION; ON WHAT ISSUES CAN WE EXPECT
SUPPORT; WHAT ISSUES ARE LARGELY IN BALANCE; AND WHAT
WOULD BE OUR MOST EFFECTIVE TACTICS?

5. ISSUES ON WHICH WE MUST GENERALLY EXPECT INDONESIAN
OPPOSITION: A) ALL SUBSTANTIVE VOTES INVOLVING ARAB-
ISRAELI QUESTION; B) ALL SUBSTANTIVE VOTES ON "NORTH-
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SOUTH" QUESTION WHERE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAVE REACHED
FULL AGREEMENT ON A POSITION WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO
OURS; C) ALL VOTES INVOLVING SOUTH AFRICA; D) ANY ISSUE
INVOLVING OPEC COUNTRIES WHERE OPEC HAS TAKEN UNIFIED
POSITION COUNTER TO OURS; E) INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE
WHICH INDONESIA HAS PUBLICLY SUPPORTED; AND F) DIEGO
GARCIA BUILD-UP WHICH IT HAS PUBLICLY OPPOSED, DESPITE
INDICATIONS SOME WITHIN GOI PRIVATELY APPRECIATE OUR

POSITION ON THESE LATTER TWO ISSUES. INDONESIAN OPPOSITION TO US POSITION ON THESE ISSUES ALMOST NEVER ACCOMPANIED BY SPEECH ATTACKING USG OR ITS MOTIVES.

6. ISSUES ON WHICH WE MIGHT MOVE INDONESIA: THERE EXISTS SOME CHANCE THAT WE MIGHT MOVE INDONESIA AWAY FROM FULL OPPOSITION ON CERTAIN ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE INDONESIA WILL NEVER VOTE AGAINST ARABS IN SUBSTANTIVE VOTE ON MIDEAST QUESTION, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN PRO-CEDURAL VOTE. WITHIN GOI THERE WERE SOME WHO -- AWARE OF LIKELY EFFECT OF ZIONISM ISSUE ON CONGRESS -- WOULD HAVE HAD INDONESIAN DELEGATION VOTE FOR OR AT LEAST ABSTAIN ON BELGIAN POSTPONEMENT MOTION. HOWEVER, ISSUE AROSE QUICKLY, EMBASSY WAS NOT ASKED TO MAKE DEMARCHE EARLY ON, AND UNINSTRUCTED INDONESIAN DELEGATION VOTED AGAINST MOTION. IN SIMILAR CASES WHERE THERE SOME CHANCE OF BLOCKING OR TONING DOWN UNWELCOME RESOLUTION ON SUBJECTS MENTIONED PARA 5 (EXCEPT SOUTH AFRICA) PRIOR TO A FULL DRESS SUBSTANTIVE VOTE, INDONESIA MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO BE HELPFUL, OR AT LEAST TO ABSTAIN.

7 ON MATTERS RELATED TO ASIA (WHERE THERE IS NOT CLEAR ASEAN STAND), GOI WILL FOLLOW OWN INTERESTS WHERE THESE ARE CLEAR; OTHERWISE WILL GENERALLY FOLLOW NON-ALIGNED POSITION. KOREA IS CASE IN POINT WHERE GOI WAS PERSUADED IT SHOULD SUPPORT SOUTH KOREAN RESOLUTION DESPITE HEAVY PRESSURE FROM PYONGYANG BUT DID NOT SEE ITS INTERESTS THREATENED BY ABSTAINING, FOR REASONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA, ON NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION. WE DOUBT THERE WILL BE BETTER SHOWING NEXT YEAR.

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ACTION SS-15

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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2632

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 JAKARTA 1823

FROM AMBASSADOR NEWSOM

8. ISSUES ON WHICH WE CAN EXPECT INDONESIAN SUPPORT:
WE CAN EXPECT INDONESIAN SUPPORT ON ISSUES WHERE THERE
IS A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES (E.G. FORMATION OF CIEC) AND ON SUCH
MATTERS AS FAMILY PLANNING WHERE OUR VIEWS ARE COMPATIBLE.
INDONESIA IS DISPOSED TO BE HELPFUL ON MATTERS OF IMPORT-
ANCE TO US WHERE COUNTER PRESSURES ARE NOT OVERWHELMING;
E.G. INDONESIA VOTED TO REDUCE US SHARE OF UN BUDGET.

9. ISSUES IN BALANCE: THIS MOST IMPORTANT AREA INCLUDES
ITEMS OF HIGHEST PRIORITY TO US, E.G. PUERTO RICO, GUAM
AND LOS. IN THESE INDONESIA WOULD BE UNLIKELY VOTE
AGAINST US POSITION IF RESOLUTION RELATED SOLELY
TO SINGLE ISSUE SUCH AS PUERTO RICO. PROBLEM COMES
BECAUSE ISSUE USUALLY PACKAGED IN WIDER RESOLUTION WITH
GENERAL ANTI-COLONIALIST TONE. INDONESIA VOTED IN
COMMITTEE OF 24 TO POSTPONE PUERTO RICO ISSUE UNTIL
FOLLOWING SESSION. IN INTERVENING PERIOD WE HAVE MADE
CLEAR TO FONMIN MALIK AND ALI MURTOPO GROUP EXTREME
IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH WE REGARD THIS ISSUE. IF CUBA
AGAIN RAISES ISSUE IN FORM GENERALLY SUPPORTED BY NON-
ALIGNED, INDONESIA WILL BE FACED WITH CHOICE OF A) SUP-
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PORTING US POSITION AND ALIENATING RADICAL COUNTRIES
WHOSE SUPPORT ON TIMOR INDONESIA SEEKS; B) VOTING WITH
RADICAL COUNTRIES AND DISAPPOINTING US, OR C) ABSTAINING
AND POSSIBLY IRRITATING BOTH SIDES. SIMILAR CHOICE
COULD ARISE IF GUAM ISSUE AGAIN SURFACES IN WIDER CONTEXT
ANTI-COLONIALISM. LOS QUESTION SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT
ONE WHICH REVOLVES AROUND POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE
PACKAGE ON ALL MAJOR LOS ISSUES INCLUDING ARCHIPELAGO
CONCEPT WHICH INCORPORATES AGREED SEALANES AND OVER-
FLIGHT ARRANGEMENTS.

10. TACTICS: GIVEN MANY OPPOSING PRESSURES, OUR
INFLUENCE WITH INDONESIA IS LIMITED. WE MUST BE
EXTREMELY SELECTIVE IN DECIDING ISSUES ON WHICH WE WILL
GO "ALL OUT" TO OBTAIN INDONESIAN SUPPORT, THOSE ON
WHICH WE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN ONLY A MEASURE OF ASSISTANCE --
OR ABSTENTION -- AND THOSE WHERE WE MUST ACCEPT THAT
GOI WILL NOT BE HELPFUL. ON ISSUES OF VITAL US INTEREST,

WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT USG, INCLUDING CONGRESS WILL NOT UNDERSTAND INDONESIAN OPPOSITION OR ABSTENTION. PUERTO RICO AND GUAM CLEARLY FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. OUR ABILITY TO TAKE A FIRM LINE ON MAJOR ISSUES IS DEPENDENT IN PART ON CONTINUATION OF US ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA, WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO OUR LEVERAGE HERE. INVERSE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPLY; WE WOULD BE UNLIKELY SECURE INDONESIAN SUPPORT BY ANY DIRECT THREAT TO CUT OFF ASSISTANCE.

11. TIMING AND MANNER OF OUR APPROACHES WILL ALSO BE RELEVANT. WITHIN GOI IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS ARE NOT DECIDED BY FONDEPT ALONE. IN CASE SUCH AS PEJORATIVE REFERENCE TO GUAM BURIED IN OTHERWISE STANDARD ANTI-COLONIAL VERBIAGE, AN EARLY ALERT TO PROBLEM WOULD GIVE US CHANCE TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH MILITARY LEADERSHIP WHICH MORE ALIVE TO IMPORTANCE OF OUR GUAM BASES THAN FONDEPT. SIMILARLY EARLY WARNING OF IMPENDING ZIONISM VOTE WOULD HAVE INCREASED CHANCES OF INDONESIA'S SUPPORT FOR (OR AT LEAST ABSTENTION ON) BELGIAN PROPOSAL.

12. THREE OTHER ELEMENTS ARE CRITICAL TO EFFECTIVE MULTI-CONFIDENTIAL

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LATERAL DIPLOMACY IN INDONESIA:

A. EFFECTIVE LIAISON AT HIGH LEVEL WITH INDONESIAN DELEGATION IN NEW YORK. DURING HEIGHT OF UNGA SESSION, MANY KEY INDONESIAN POLICY MAKERS, INCLUDING MALIK, SPEND MUCH TIME IN NEW YORK. WHEN HE IS NOT THERE HE DELEGATES SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISIONS TO AMBASSADOR SANI. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT RELATIONS OF OUR USUN MISSION WITH SANI COULD BE IMPROVED; SUCH IMPROVEMENT AND CONSTANT LIAISON IS CRITICAL IF WE ARE TO EXERT INFLUENCE IN FAST MOVING EVENTS IN NEW YORK.

B. EFFECTIVE WORK BY OTHER COUNTRIES. WE CANNOT BE OUT IN FRONT ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES AND HAVE THEM SILENT. INDONESIAN POSITION ON KOREA WAS STRENGTHENED BY ACTIVE ROLE OF SOUTH KOREANS HERE AND IN NEW YORK. ON OTHER HAND, WHEN WE TALK ABOUT JAPANESE INTEREST OR WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THIS AND OTHER ISSUES, WE FIND ONLY SILENCE AND INACTIVITY ON THEIR PART.

C. CONTINUED US ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA. ASSISTANCE MEANS ACCESS TO TOP POLICY MAKERS. THESE ARE DIFFICULT MEN TO SEE, PARTICULARLY IN ECONOMIC FIELD. THEY ESTABLISH STRICT PRIORITIES ON WHOM THEY SEE ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE OTHER NATIONS HAVE TO INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT. SAME IS TRUE ON MILITARY SIDE.

13. WITH RESPECT ORGANIZATION WITHIN EMBASSY, I HAVE
ASSIGNED FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY TO POLITICAL
COUNSELOR. IN LAST ANALYSIS, GIVEN RELATIVE FEW WHO
HOLD POWER OF DECISION, SUCCESS WILL DEPEND ON ACCESS
AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND ON HOW EFFECTIVELY WE CAN
OPERATE WITH INDONESIANS IN NEW YORK AND OTHER LOCI
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES.
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